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REMOTENESS OF CONTRACTUAL DAMAGES 
 
Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The “Achilleas”) 




 On 9 July 2008, the House of Lords handed down its decision in 
Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The “Achilleas”).1  
Overturning a series of lower decisions, the House of Lords unanimously 
decided to restrict the damages available for the breach of a charterparty 
caused by the late re-delivery of the ship.  The case will undoubtedly be 
important for those in the shipping industry, but will also be important for the 




The Achilleas, a bulk carrier owned by Mercator, was let under a time 
charter dated 22 January 2003 to Transfield for about five to seven months at 
a daily hire rate of US$13,500.  On 12 September 2003 the parties extended 
this for a further five to seven months at a daily rate of US$16,750. The latest 
date for redelivery was 2 May 2004.   By April 2004 market rates had more 
than doubled. Transfield gave notice of redelivery between 30 April and 2 
May 2004. Mercator then fixed the vessel for a new four to six month hire to 
Cargill, following on from the first charter, at a daily rate of US$39,500. The 
latest date for delivery to Cargill, after which they were entitled to cancel, was 
8 May 2004. 
With less than a fortnight of the original charter to run, Transfield fixed 
the vessel under a subcharter to carry coals from Qingdao in China across the 
Yellow Sea to discharge at two Japanese ports. It was reasonably expected 
that Transfield could still redeliver by 2 May 2004 and Mercator made no 
objection. The vessel was unfortunately delayed and was not redelivered to 
Mercator until 11 May.  
 
* Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Buckingham, LLB (Toronto), LLM (Cantab), 
Barrister and Solicitor, Law Society of Upper Canada. 
1 [2008] UKHL 48; [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275. 
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By 5 May it had become clear to everyone that the vessel would not be 
available to Cargill before the cancelling date of 8 May. By that time, rates 
had fallen again. In return for an extension of the cancellation date to 11 May, 
Mercator agreed with Cargill to reduce the rate of hire for the new fixture to 
US$31,500 a day. 
Mercator claimed damages for the loss of the difference between the 
original rate and the reduced rate over the period of the fixture. At US$8,000 a 
day, the total sum amounted to US$1,364,584.37. Transfield said that 
Mercator were not entitled to damages calculated by reference to their 
dealings with the new charterers and that they were entitled only to the 
difference between the market rate and the charter rate for the nine days 
during which they were deprived of the use of the ship, which it estimated 




The dispute was referred to arbitration.  The arbitrators all found that the 
damage claimed by the owners was of a type not unlikely to occur upon the 
breach of the contract and therefore fell within the first limb of the test in 
Hadley v Baxendale2 as arising “naturally, ie according to the usual course of 
things, from such breach of contract itself”.3  In spite of this, all of the 
arbitrators found that had anyone in the shipping industry been asked, they 
would have said that this type of damages was not recoverable.   The majority  
took the view however that, despite the view of the shipping industry , this 
had no effect on the recoverability of the damages, and therefore found for the 
claimant. 
On appeal from the arbitrators, Christopher Clarke J4 and the Court of 
Appeal (Ward, Tuckey and Rix LJJ)5 upheld the majority decision.  Rix LJ 
observed that in none of the earlier cases was the recoverability of damages 
for the loss of a subsequent charter actually in issue.  The case was therefore 
to be decided based on Hadley v Baxendale principles and he found that “The 
refixing of the vessel at the end of the charterers’ charter was not merely ‘not 
unlikely’ it was in truth highly probable (barring other possibilities).”6  The 
2 (1854) 9 Exch 341. 
3 Ibid, at 354. 
4 [2007] 1 Lloyd's Rep 19. 
5 [2007] 2 Lloyd's Rep 555. 
6 [2007] 2 Lloyds Rep 555, at 574. 
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Court of Appeal decision was met by much criticism, partially on how the 
decision was so out of line with the accepted view in the industry.7
 
HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
In the House of Lords, the appeal was allowed and damages were reduced 
to the difference between the charter rate and the market rate for the period of 
the delay.  The damages for the loss of the subsequent charter were not 
recoverable as being too remote.  There were two different approaches taken 
by the House in order to reach this result. 
Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale took what Baroness Hale called the 
“narrower ground”.8  Lord Rodger explains: 
 
“…I am satisfied that, when they entered into the addendum in 
September 2003, neither party would reasonably have contemplated 
that an overrun of nine days would “in the ordinary course of things” 
cause the owners the kind of loss for which they claim damages. That 
loss was not the “ordinary consequence” of a breach of that kind. It 
occurred in this case only because of the extremely volatile market 
conditions which produced both the owners' initial (particularly 
lucrative) transaction, with a third party, and the subsequent pressure 
on the owners to accept a lower rate for that fixture. Back in 
September 2003 this loss could not have been reasonably foreseen as 
being likely to arise out of the delay in question. It was, accordingly, 
too remote to give rise to a claim for damages for breach of contract.”9
 
As this resolved the question on appeal, Lord Rodger and Baroness Hale  
found it unnecessary to decide on the issues discussed below. 
The wider grounds for allowing the appeal are developed by Lord 
Hoffman, making reference to recent academic literature.10  While the rule in 
Hadley v Baxendale will be usually be enough, in some cases there will need 
7 See J Sundaram “Is the Court of Appeal Decision in the Achilleas Good Law?” 
[2008] Denning Law Journal 187; Weale “Dogs that Didn’t Bark” [2008] LMCLQ 6; 
Halson “Time Charters, Damages and Remoteness” [2008] LCMLQ 119. 
8 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 293. 
9 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 286. 
10 In particular A Kramer “An Agreement-Centred Approach to Remoteness and 
Contract Damages” in Cohen and McKendrick (eds) Comparative Remedies for 
Breach of Contract, (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2005) pp 249-286; Andrew Tettenborn 
“Hadley v Baxendale Foreseeability: a Principle Beyond its Sell-By Date” (2007) 23 
Journal of Contract Law 120-147; Andrew Robertson “The Basis of the Remoteness 
Rule in Contract” (2008) 28 Legal Studies 172. 
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to be a further limit on damages.  Lord Hoffman states that liability should be 
based “upon the interpretation of the contract as a whole, construed in its 
commercial setting”11 referring to the use of terms implied as a matter of law 
developed in Liverpool City Council v Irwin.12    
While there will not be much evidence of the commercial setting in most 
contracts, he suggests that some types of contracts, such as shipping and 
banking contracts, provide examples where a further limit on damages might 
be imposed by way of an implied term.  Based on this, he finds that in a 
charterparty, there is an implied term as a matter of law that the loss of profit 
from a subsequent fixture is not a type of loss being assumed by the 
charterer.13  
Lord Hope appears to agree with this approach.  He says: 
 
“The fact that the loss was foreseeable - the kind of result that the 
parties would have had in mind, as the majority arbitrators put it - is 
not the test. Greater precision is needed than that. The question is 
whether the loss was a type of loss for which the party can reasonably 
be assumed to have assumed responsibility.”14
 
Lord Walker’s speech does not expressly follow either the narrow view or 
the wider view although he expressly adopts the reasons given in the speeches 
of Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope and Lord Rodger.15 But in conclusion, his 
decision returns to the large, unpredictable nature of the damages when he 
states: 
 
“But it was contrary to the principle stated in the Victoria Laundry 
case, and reaffirmed in The Heron II, to suppose that the parties were 
contracting on the basis that the charterers would be liable for any 
loss, however large, occasioned by a delay in re-delivery in 
circumstances where the charterers had no knowledge of, or control 
over, the new fixture entered into by the new owners.”16
11 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 278. 
12  [1977] AC 239. 
13 Lord Hoffman draws an analogy with his own speech in Banque Bruxelles Lambert 
SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (sub nom South Australia Asset Management 
Corporation v York Montague Ltd) [1997] AC 191. 
14 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 282. 
15 Ironically Lord Walker impliedly criticises the decision in The Heron II for the 
same reason. He states: “The House's decision was unanimous but each member of 
the Appellate Committee gave a full opinion, and unfortunately none of them in terms 
expressed either agreement or disagreement with any of the others.” 
16 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 292. 
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(a) The narrow approach 
 
The narrow approach taken by Lords Rodger and Walker and Baroness Hale 
appears to be in line with the decision in Victoria Laundry v Newman.17  In 
Victoria Laundry, a distinction is made between the ordinary profits made in 
the usual course of things and the extraordinary profits that would have been 
earned under a government contract.  The type of liability, lost profits, is 
within the contemplation of the parties when they make their contract.  But at 
some point the loss becomes sufficiently large so as to make it of a type that 
goes beyond their contemplation. 
In The Achilleas, the large fluctuations in the market result in the loss 
suffered on the subsequent charter being much greater than anticipated.  This 
results in the damages being of a type not contemplated by the parties when 
the contract is made. There is therefore a well-established basis for reaching a 
decision based on these grounds.   
But this approach does operate in a state of tension with the general 
principle that the remoteness test limits the type of damage but not their 
extent.18 It creates an uncertain line as to when the extent of the damages 
makes them a different type of loss.  Would there be a different decision if the 
change in the market was only slight so that the lost charter resulted in only 
slightly higher damages?   
There is also a concern as to whether this is the correct approach to be 
taking to this case. Is the understanding of the shipping community that 
damages are not to include such losses irrelevant?  It may be that Lord 
Hoffman is correct and that a broader view is required on these facts. 
 
(b) The broader approach 
 
The broader view is that this type of damage is not recoverable because in 
this type of contract, there is an implied term that these damages have not 
been assumed by the defendant. This type of approach is attractive as it 
resolves a number of questions created by a test which only uses Hadley v 
Baxendale principles.  In the classic example of hiring a cab to take you to an 
17 [1949] 2 KB 528. 
18 In C Czarnikow Ltd v Koufos (The Heron II) [1969] 1 AC 350, there was a rise in 
the sugar market which was found to be not too remote.  In Seven Seas Properties v 
Al-Essa [1993] 1WLR 1083, a large profit made by flipping the property to a second 




                                                     
important meeting, no matter how much the cab driver is contemplating your 
loss,19 he will not be liable for the loss you have suffered by missing the 
meeting.  Lord Hoffman would say that in this type of contract, it is implied 
that the cab driver is not assuming liability for that type of loss. 
The approach taken by Lord Hoffman does raise at least two questions.  
The first question relates to the burden of proof.  Is it up to the defendant to 
prove it did not assume liability for the type of loss or up to the claimant to 
prove that it did assume liability.  Lord Hoffman appears to be taking the 
approach that it is up to the claimant to show that there is an implied term 
whereby the defendant assumed liability.20  But if this is what Lord Hoffman 
is arguing, he would not appear to have the support of Lord Walker.21
The second question is the process of implying a term as a matter of law 
in this type of situation.  It is clear that this term is being implied into the 
particular type of contract.  It is less clear whether this implication comes 
from the shared view of the industry or whether it comes from the need to 
avoid the uncertainty the defendant would face if this type of contract exposed 
it to this type of liability.  It may be that a number of considerations can be 




By approaching remoteness as a term implied by law, Lord Hoffman has 
potentially found a new approach for remoteness and also many other 
doctrines of contract law.  They all can be treated as a type of term implied by 
law.  The great advantage of this approach is that you are not seeking to find 
what the parties would have said, but rather involve the court in trying to find 
the ideal default position for that type of contract. This will have to take into 
account what most parties would have said in the circumstances, but need not 
put words into the mouth of the particular parties. Hopefully it will try to find 
not only a reasonable position, but also try to find the most useful position for 
the type of contract.  The ideas of the industry will be relevant to finding a 
useful default position. It might also take into account ideas of 
proportionality, risk allocation and insurance. The overall effort should be a 
pragmatic one, striving to find the position which is most useful to parties 
19 For instance because you have told him directly. 
20 [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 275, at 278. He makes the point that this is consistent with his 
approach in Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd (sub nom 
South Australia Asset Management Corporation v York Montague Ltd) [1997] AC 
191. 
21 He appears to reject the need to imply a term to create liability at para 68, following 
Lord Upjohn in The Heron II. 
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who wish to contract and which could be safely predicted at the time of the 
making of the contract. 
The Achilleas potentially opens the door for a greater use of terms implied 
by law to resolve difficulties in general contract doctrines. It allows for the 
consideration of factors applying to a type of contract rather than making do 
with a single doctrine to fit all types of contracts. We will now see if future 
courts take advantage of that potential. 
